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Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa on theses (dam bca ,ʼ 
pratijñā) in Madhyamaka thought*
Chizuko Yoshimizu
Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa ʼByuṅ gnas ye śes (alias Yes śes ʼbyuṅ gnas, ac-
tive in the fi rst half of the 12th century)1 is reported to have been 
one of the chief disciples of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (1055–ca. 1145), 
who translated Candrakīrti’s main treatises into the Tibetan lan-
guage.2 One composition by Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa is now available to us 
in the form of a handwritten manuscript: a complete commentary 
on Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (Pr) entitled dBu ma tshig gsal gyi 
 * My special thanks are due to Kevin Vose, who corrected the English 
of the present paper, and Pascale Hugon for their valuable suggestions 
and comments.
 1 Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa is supposed to have belonged to the Źaṅ clan and 
resided in Thaṅ sag monastery, which he himself built in ʼPhan yul, north 
of lHa sa, where Pa tshab was born and based after his return to Tibet. 
Presumably Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa learned from Pa tshab after the latter had 
returned to Tibet from Kashmir around 1101 (cf. Yoshimizu 2005: 128 
n. 2). According to Chos ʼphel (2004: 166f.), the Thaṅ sag monastery 
was converted from bKaʼ gdams pa to dGe lugs pa at the time of the 5th 
Dalai Lama. It is therefore to be identifi ed with the current dGe lugs 
temple dGaʼ ldan chos ʼkhor dgon, the foundation of which Śes gñen 
tshul khrims (2001: 203) ascribes to Źaṅ Ye śes ʼbyuṅ gnas in the 13th 
century. I am indebted to Maho Iuchi for the information about Thaṅ sag 
monastery. Iuchi (2007: 62) presents the list of the bKaʼ gdams pa temples 
surrounding lHa sa.
 2 Pa tshab translated into Tibetan the Prasannapadā, the Madhya ma-
kā va tāra and its Bhāṣya as well as the Catuḥśatakaṭīkā. In some bio-
graphical literature, Pa tshab is also given the clan name Źaṅ. Cf. Seyfort 
Ruegg 2000: 45 n. 89.
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ti ka. This manuscript is defi nitely a discovery of great importance 
for the study of Tibetan scholasticism in the 11–12th centuries.3
As I have previously discussed, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa held the Ma-
dhya maka theory of “freedom from extremes” (mthaʼ bral dbu 
ma) in terms of “neither existence nor non-existence” (yod min 
med min), which is the exact view that the later Sa skya scholar 
Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge (1429–1507) ascribed to him.4 
With regard to Candrakīrti’s defense (in the fi rst chapter of the 
Prasannapadā) of Buddha pālita’s statements, against Bhāviveka’s 
attacks on them,5 unlike later Tibetans Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa never ex-
presses the idea that the Madhyamaka school thereby divided into 
two branches, the Thal gʼyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) and the Raṅ rgyud 
pa (*Svātantrika). He is rather of the opinion that a raṅ rgyud pa, 
such as Bhāviveka, who uses an autonomous inference (raṅ rgyud 
rjes dpag, svatantrānumāna) is unqualifi ed to claim to be a dbu 
ma pa6 and that between a raṅ rgyud pa and a dbu ma pa there 
is no common establishment (mthun snaṅ = ubhayasiddha) of the 
subject of debate.7 Following Candrakīrti, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa does 
 3 For detailed features of the manuscript, the authorship, as well as 
the historical fi gure of Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa, cf. Yoshimizu 2005 and 2006, 
which include an edition of the 18th chapter and of some parts of the fi rst 
chapter. This manuscript is not included in the recently published bKaʼ 
gdams gsuṅ ʼbum.
 4 lTa ba iʼ śan ʼbyed 8a4–8b1 and 17b3f.; cited in Yoshimizu 2005: 130 
n. 10. For Go rams pa’s detailed discussion, cf. Matsumoto 1999: 205ﬀ . 
and Cabezón and Dargyay 2007: 203ﬀ .
 5 For a detailed investigation of Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s interpretation 
of Buddhapālita’s statements, Bhāviveka’s criticism thereof, as well 
as Candrakīrti’s rejoinder focusing on the reading of Pr 18,5–19,7, see 
Yoshimizu 2006: 87ﬀ . (English summary on 114). 
 6 See dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 21b1–4 edited in Yoshimizu 
2006: 102f. (Text 1) and translated in ibid.: 81. Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa does not 
use the appellation Thal gʼyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) as a branch name refer-
ring to the Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti lineage, although he calls them the 
advocates of prasaṅga reasoning (thal ʼgyur smra ba) (cf., e.g., 6b5 cited 
below in n. 8).
 7 Therefore, in Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s view, dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa is not 
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not accept an autonomous inference as a means of establishing ul-
timate reality,8 since, as taught by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva,9 the 
Mādhyamika (dbu ma pa) disowns any doctrinal position (phyogs, 
pakṣa) or thesis (dam bca ,ʼ pratijñā) to be proven on his own ac-
count.
Thus, on one hand strictly rejecting formal probative reason-
ing, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa on the other hand adopts in his own dis-
cussion plenty of logical terms such as reason (he du, hetu), per-
vasion (khyab pa, vyāpti), argument (ʼ thad pa, upapatti) and the 
like.10 The fl ourishing of pramāṇa studies in his time well accounts 
established. See dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 21b1–4 edited in Yoshimizu 
2006: 102 (Text 1) and translated in ibid.: 81. 
 8 Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa states that the Mādhyamika may use an autono-
mous inference if not investigating ultimate reality. See dBu ma tshig 
gsal gyi ti ka 6b5 (cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2005: 132): don dam 
spyod (read: dpyod) pa iʼ skabs min pas / (sic) raṅ rgyud byas kyaṅ ʼgal 
ba med // de phyir thal ʼgyur smra ba la // ʼgal ba iʼ ñes pa mi bsam mo // 
Go rams pa quotes the fi rst half of this verse in his dBu ma iʼ spyi ston 
(105a1f.) as a statement by Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa without specifying the source 
(see Yoshimizu 2005: 132). For citations from the dBu ma tshig gsal gyi 
ti ka, I retain orthographic peculiarities of the manuscript, which I have 
listed in Yoshimizu 2005: 138. 
 9 Cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV) 29–30 cited in Pr D6a3f., P6b5f.: gal te 
ṅas dam bcas ʼgaʼ yod // des na ṅa la skyon de yod // ṅa la dam bcaʼ med 
pas na // ṅa la skyon med kho na yin // gal te mṅon sum la sogs pa iʼ // don 
gyis ʼgaʼ źig dmigs na ni // sgrub pa ʼam (D ʼaṅ) bzlog par bya na de // 
med phyir ṅa la klan ka med // = L. de La Vallée Poussin ed. (LVP) 16,7–
10: yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva (VV Johnston & Kunst 1978 
reads eṣa) me bhaved doṣaḥ  / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti 
me doṣaḥ // yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā / 
pra tya kṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me ʼnupālambhaḥ  // *Lakṣaṇaṭīkā 
(LṬ) edited by Yonezawa 2004: 132; Catuḥśataka (CŚ) 6.25 cited in Pr 
D6a2f., P6b4f.: yod daṅ med daṅ yod med ces // phyogs ni gaṅ la ʼaṅ yod 
min pa // de la yun ni rin po naʼaṅ // klan ka brjod par nus ma yin // = LVP 
16,4f.: sadasatsadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate / upālambhaś cireṇāpi 
tasya vaktuṃ na śakyate // Cf. further the investigation of these verses in 
Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 115ﬀ .
 10 For instance, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa terms the three verses cited above (see 
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for his broad knowledge of the Buddhist logico-epistemological 
system.11 To a certain extent, indeed, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa admits 
Mādhyamikas’ commitments to logical argumentation. It is well-
known that Candrakīrti has called “theses” (pratijñā) Nāgārjuna’s 
negative statements in Mūla madhyamakakārikā (MMK) 1.1.12 Źaṅ 
Thaṅ sag pa also calls “theses” (dam bcaʼ) Buddhapālita’s com-
mentarial statements on MMK 1.1 as will be seen below, as well as 
several of Candrakīrti’s statements including Madhyamakāvatāra 
(MA) 6.8cd, which is cited in the Prasannapadā.13 How should one 
n. 9), viz., CŚ 6.25 and VV 29–30 “three arguments for the Mādhyamika’s 
lacking probandum and argument” (dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 15a3: dbu 
ma pa la sgrub bya daṅ tʼhad pa med pa iʼ tʼhad pa gsum). Rejecting the 
Mādhya mi ka’s use of probandum and argument, he thus gives arguments 
for the rejection.
 11 It is, however, unknown whether Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa received educa-
tion at gSaṅ phu sNeʼu thog monastery, which was the centre of pramāṇa 
studies at that time. We cannot exclude the possibility that he learned log-
ic from Pa tshab and Kanakavarman, for both of them supposedly inher-
ited the tradition of Buddhist logic that fl ourished in Kashmir. Moreover, 
Pa tshab’s fi rst collaborator Mahāsumati is described as a great logician 
in the colophon of the Prasannapadā (see Yoshimizu 2005: 133 n. 19).
 12 Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (MABh) 81,17ﬀ .: de bźin du dam bcaʼ 
bag sum char la yaṅ sbyar bar byaʼo  // dam bcaʼ ba bźi po de rjes su 
brjod nas rigs pas sgrub pa iʼ phyir bśad pa / Pr LVP 13,2f.: tataś caivaṃ 
saṃbandhaḥ, naiva svata utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke 
cana / evaṃ pratijñā trayam api yojyaṃ // Cf. MMK 1.1 (cited in Pr LVP 
12,13f.): na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu 
vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana // Cf. also dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 
10a1f.: de bźi car las skye bar mi tʼhad do sñam du ṅes pa ni ʼphags pa klu 
grub la mṅaʼ nas dam bcaʼ mdzad do //
 13 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 11b5f.: skye bar gyur pa slar yaṅ skye bar 
rigs pa ʼaṅ ma yin ñid (= MA 6.8cd) ces pa ste dam bcaʼ tsam mo // Cf. 
MA 6.8 (cited in Pr LVP 13,7–8): tasmād dhi tasya bhavane na guṇo sʼti 
kaścij / jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva yuktam // Cf. also dBu ma tshig 
gsal gyi ti ka 14a5, where Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa terms dam bcaʼ Candrakīrti’s 
refutation of Bhāviveka’s assertion: tshig de dag gis ni ñes pa brjod par mi 
rigs ces dam bcaʼ bstan te / = “[Candrakīrti] presents a thesis by saying 
‘[it is] not proper’ [that Bhāviveka] has indicated failures by those words 
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distinguish these “theses” which Indian Madhyamaka masters are 
supposed to have advocated from those theses which they all have 
rejected?
In the present paper, I would like to clarify how Źaṅ Thaṅ sag 
pa confronted this most controversial problem in the history of 
the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition, which his contemporary 
as well as later Tibetan scholars were also destined to encoun-
ter.14 I will fi rst examine Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s arguments for distin-
guishing between acceptable theses and unacceptable theses for 
Mādhyamikas. The focus will be on his interpretation of the kind 
of thesis that is grounded in the logical system of Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti. Then, I will analyze his ontology-based defense of 
the theory that for the Mādhyamika negation is not what is to be 
proven (sgrub bya, sādhya), confi rming an essential link between 
this theory and the theory of neither existence nor non-existence 
(yod min med min), according to which the negation should eventu-
ally be negated as well. Our fi nal aim is to gain a clearer perspec-
tive of the historical development of Tibetan Madhyamaka, which 
has proceeded in a close relation to the Buddhist logico-epistemo-
logical tradition. 
Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s arguments for and against the Mādhyamika’s 
use of theses
Insofar as the statements of MMK 1.1 are concerned, the fact that 
Candrakīrti has referred to them as theses (pratijñā) requires an ex-
planation from later interpreters, for it is obviously contradictory to 
his own statement that Mādhyamikas have no thesis of their own.15 
[in Buddha pālita’s commentarial statements on MMK 1.1].”
 14 Seyfort Ruegg (2000: Section II, especially 115ﬀ . and 219ﬀ .) has 
provided a detailed investigation of this problem in the Indo-Tibetan 
Madhyamaka tradition.
 15 See Pr LVP 23,3: nāsmākaṃ svapratijñāyā abhāvāt  / Accepting 
the ambiguity of Candrakīrti’s usage of the word pratijñā, Matsumoto 
(1997: 372f., 383) has inferred that Candrakīrti just followed Bhāviveka in 
calling MMK 1.1 theses while insisting that the Mādhyamika has no the-
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Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa solves this problem by explaining that Candrakīrti 
applies the word pratijñā or dam bcaʼ in “mere transactional us-
age” (tha sñad tsam). Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa also describes such a thesis 
as “mere thesis” (dam bcaʼ tsam) or “mere name” (miṅ tsam) and 
opposes it to a “genuine thesis” (dam bcaʼ rnal ma),16 notably to the 
thesis or the position (pakṣa)17 defi ned by Dignāga. Źaṅ Thaṅ sag 
pa says as follows:
[1] [Each statement in MMK 1.1 is] thus called a root thesis (rtsa ba iʼ 
dam bcaʼ) but [this is] mere transactional usage (tha sñad tsam), for 
[this thesis] is not a [thesis] like that which has fi ve characteristics 
(mtshan ñid lṅa), namely: 1) [stated in its own] form ([raṅ gi] ṅo bo, 
[sva]rūpa), 2) alone (kho na, eva), 3) being intended (ʼ dod pa, iṣṭa), 
4) [by him]self (bdag ñid, svayam), 5) [and] unopposed (ma bsal ba, 
anirākta), [which are regarded as] the defi ning characteristics of the 
thesis (dam bca iʼ mtshan ñid).18
sis of his own (i.e., according to Matsumoto, svatantrā pratijñā). Seyfort 
Ruegg (2000: 129f.) has proposed to distinguish between a pratijñā as 
a philosophical statement or thesis by Mādhyamikas that does not posit 
any substantial self-existence and a thesis that posits a substantial self-
existence, which Mādhyamikas reject.
 16 Cf. dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 11b5f. cited above in n. 13, which 
comments on MA 6.8, and 10b1f. cited below in n. 34.
 17 The words pratijñā (dam bcaʼ), pakṣa (phyogs) and sādhya (sgrub 
bya) are generally used as equivalents in both Indian and Tibetan logical 
traditions. Dharmakīrti employs in his verse commentary on PS 3.2ab 
the word sādhya for pakṣa, which is to bear the fourfold characteris-
tic of the thesis (PV 4.28, cited and translated in Tillemans 2000: 48: 
gamyārthatve ʼ pi sādhyokter asaṃmo hāya lakṣaṇam / tac caturlakṣaṇaṃ 
rūpa nipāteṣṭasvayaṃpadaiḥ //). Tillemans (2000: 4, n. 16) indicates that 
Dignāga uses the terms anumeyanirdeśa, pakṣa vacana and sādhyanirdeśa 
as synonyms. Those equivalent terms, pratijñā, pakṣa and sādhya, are 
employed as such by Mādhyamikas too (cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 130f.). 
Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa himself admits that they are equivalents (dBu ma tshig 
gsal gyi ti ka 13a3f.: dam bcaʼ daṅ sgrub bya daṅ phyogs ni rnam graṅs 
so).
 18 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 10b1: de ltar na rtsa ba iʼ dam bcaʼ źes 
pa yaṅ tha sñad tsam yin te // dam bca iʼ mtshan ñid ṅo bo kho na dʼod pa 
bdag ñid ma {bsal} (Ms. gsal) ba ces pa mtshan ñid lṅa ldan lta bu ma 
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The fi ve defi ning characteristics of the thesis enumerated here 
can be identifi ed with those which Dignāga stated in Pramāṇa-
samuccaya  (PS) 3.2 as pakṣalakṣaṇa. Dharmakīrti, let us note, 
only considered the fi rst four as such.19 Let us see PS 3.2:
[PS 3.2] [A valid thesis] is one which is intended (iṣṭa) by [the propo-
nent] himself (svayam) as something to be stated in its proper form 
alone (svarūpeṇaiva) [i.e., as a sādhya]; [and] with regard to [the pro-
ponent’s] own subject, it is not opposed (anirākta) by perceptible 
objects, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly recog-
nized.20
Now it is clear that Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa diﬀ erentiates the “genu-
ine thesis” fulfi lling the Buddhist logicians’ defi nition from the 
set of theses acknowledged by Candrakīrti as “mere transac-
tional usage.” Accordingly, one could oﬀ er as a hypothesis that 
the Mādhyamika may advocate a thesis if it is not intended as a 
yin no //
 19 See PV 4.28–29 (cited and translated in Ono 1986: 849 and Tillemans 
2000: 48f.) and Tillemans ibid.: 49. The enumeration of these fi ve charac-
teristics appears in PV 4.85 (ibid.: 116: svayaṃnipātarūpākhyā vyatire ka-
sya bā dhi kāḥ / sahānirākteneṣṭaśrutir avyāptibādhanī //), where Dhar-
ma kīrti explains that Dignāga’s defi nition of the thesis serves to eliminate 
the faults of over- and non-pervasion (ativyāpti, avyāpti).
 20 PS 3.2: svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo ʼnirāktaḥ / pra tya kṣā -
rthānu mā nāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi // The English translation and 
the Sanskrit reconstruction follow Tillemans 2000: 47. The Tibetan ver-
sion runs (Tillemans 2000: 47 n. 166, cf. Kitagawa 1973: 471f.): raṅ gi ṅo 
bo kho nar bstan // bdag dʼod raṅ gi chos can la // mṅon sum don daṅ rjes 
dpag daṅ // yid ches grags pas ma bsal baʼo // Cf. also Nyāyabindu (NB) 
3.38: svarūpeṇaiva sva yam iṣṭo ʼnirāktaḥ pakṣa iti  // NM 1: svayaṃ 
sādhya tve nepsitaḥ pakṣo vi ruddhā rthānirāktaḥ  / cited in Pramāṇa-
vārtti kavtti (PVV) 320,16 [443,3ﬀ .]; Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya (PVBh) 
510,23f.; and Tillemans 2000: 117f. Dignāga refutes in PS 3.3 and 3.5 
respectively the Nyāyasūtra’s defi nition of the thesis as a presentation of 
the probandum (sādhyanirdeśa) and that in Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi as 
a statement of the probandum (sādhyābhidhāna). See Tillemans ibid.: 39 
n. 145. 
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probandum (sādhya) by the Mādhyamika himself.21 This distinc-
tion between the Mādhyamika’s use of theses and that advocated 
by Buddhist logicians is supported by the thesis-defi nitions of 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in Nyāyamukha (NM) 1 and Pramāṇa-
vārttika (PV) 4.86ab, which say respectively: “The thesis (or the 
position) is what is intended by [the proponent] himself as the 
probandum” (svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo…) and “What is 
accepted as the probandum is the defi ning characteristic of the 
thesis” (sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣalakṣaṇaṃ).22 In light of those 
logicians’ defi nitions, the Mādhyamika’s principle, in turn, would 
clearly emerge in contrast, that the Mādhyamika or the follower of 
the middle way is one who neither intends to prove something nor 
accepts what is to be proven (sādhya) as his own.23
The Mādhyamika’s rejection of autonomous inference (sva-
tantrānumāna) also results from his non-acceptance (anabhyupa-
ga ma) of sādhya, as Candrakīrti explains in his Prasannapadā.24 It 
 21 As for the fi fth characteristic, “unopposed by perceptible objects, 
etc.,” it is unclear whether the Mādhyamika is totally free from this 
condition. However, the fact that Candrakīrti did not ultimately accept 
Dignāga’s theory of valid cognition (pramāṇa) (cf. Yoshimizu 1996) may 
allow us to conjecture that this condition is acceptable for Mādhyamikas 
only in the case of investigating common sense objects.
 22 Cf. n. 20 above and Tillemans 2000: 117f.
 23 In this regard, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa expressly defi nes the Mādhyamika 
as the one who has no doctrinal position (phyogs med pa) of his own and 
hence excludes Bhāviveka, who sets forth a probandum or a doctrinal 
position (sgrub bya ʼam phyogs), from the lineage of Nāgārjuna. Cf. dBu 
ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 14b8: dbu ma pa ces pa ni phyogs med pa la zer la 
legs ldan khyod raṅ rgyud byed na ni dbu ma pa ma yin źiṅ klu iʼ rjes su mi 
ʼbraṅ pa źig ste / sgrub bya ʼam phyogs dʼod pa iʼ phyir ro //
 24 Pr LVP 16,2: na ca mādhyamikasya svataḥ svatantram anumānaṃ 
kartuṃ yuktaṃ pakṣāntarābhyupagamābhāvāt / (The Tibetan translation 
D6a2, P6b3f., omits svataḥ) = “For the Mādhyamika, it is not appropri-
ate to formulate an autonomous inference on his own account, because 
[for him] there is no acceptance of the positions alternative [to the posi-
tion that things arise from themselves, for instance, the position that they 
arise from an other].” Although Candrakīrti is here rejecting the four 
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would therefore be natural that whoever has no intention to prove 
something positively neither states a thesis on his own account nor 
formulates an inference independently of his opponent’s asser-
tion. “Autonomous” (svatantra) can be interpreted as synonymous 
with “intended by the proponent himself” (svayam iṣṭa) in terms of 
Dignāga, even if it is unclear whether Candrakīrti knew Dignāga’s 
thesis-defi nition. 
Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa makes this point clear in his own defi ni-
tion of autonomous inference as well as in his commentary on 
Candrakīrti’s refutation of autonomous inference:
[Defi nition:] Autonomous inference is the proof of a probandum 
(sgrub bya, sādhya) that has a [genuine] characteristic (mtshan ñid 
daṅ ldan pa, *lakṣaṇavat/lākṣaṇika) by means of [a logical reason 
fulfi lling] the three conditions (tshul gsum, trirūpa[liṅga]) that are es-
tablished for both proponent and opponent by a valid means of cogni-
tion (tshad ma, pramāṇa).25
[2] The thought [expressed by Candrakīrti] here [in Pr LVP 16,2] is 
[the following]: The formulation of an autonomous logical reason 
(raṅ rgyud kyi he tu) [i.e., an autonomous reasoning or inference] 
entails (khyab) that the probandum (sgrub bya, sādhya) has a [genu-
ine] characteristic (mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa). It is not appropriate for 
the Mādhyamika to state an autonomous logical reason [i.e., an au-
tonomous reasoning] because for him there is no probandum, which 
would be entailed (khyab byed du gyur pa) [by an autonomous logical 
reason].26
alternative positions of the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi, mu bźi) enumerated 
in MMK 1.1, he has undoubtedly extended the scope to all possible doc-
trinal positions. Pr LVP 18,5f. cited below in n. 27 is also often referred 
to as Candrakīrti’s refutation of autonomous inference. For his criticism 
of autonomous inference, cf. further, e.g., Yotsuya 1999: 47ﬀ ., Seyfort 
Ruegg 2000: 129ﬀ . and Yoshimizu 2003: 269ﬀ . 
 25 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 14b8f. edited in Yoshimizu 2006: 104 
(Text 2): raṅ rgyud ni sgrub bya mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa la tshul gsum 
rgol phyir rgol gñis ka iʼ tshad mas grub pa źig gis sgrub paʼo // 
 26 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 15a1f.: de iʼ bsam pa ni raṅ rgyud kyi he 
du byed pa la sgrub bya mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pas khyab la / dbu ma pa 
la khyab byed du gyur pa iʼ sgrub bya med pa iʼ phyir raṅ rgyud kyi he du 
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While Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa does not say what he has in mind by the 
expression “a probandum that has a characteristic” (sgrub bya 
mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa), the most plausible reading is to take it as a 
probandum that has the fi vefold characteristic of a genuine thesis in 
accordance with the aforementioned logicians’ thesis-defi nitions. 
In short, it is a probandum “intended by the proponent himself” 
(i.e., svayam iṣṭa). 
In this manner, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa rules out both the genuine the-
ses of the Buddhist logicians and autonomous inferences from the 
Mādhyamika’s logical scene. Consequently, whatever inferential 
statement Madhyamaka masters have properly made must be either 
a prasaṅga reasoning or an other-acknowledged inference (para-
prasiddhānumāna, gźan grags rjes dpag), the probandum of which 
is not intended by the Mādhyamika himself. Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa ac-
tually reads Buddhapālita’s commentarial statement on MMK 1.1 
twofold as a prasaṅga as well as an other-acknowledged inference.27 
What is interesting for our discussion is that in both interpreta-
brjod par mi rigs so //
 27 In this respect, one should note that Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa interprets Pr LVP 
18,5–19,7, which has recently aroused discussion among modern scholars, 
to deal with the question of whether the Mādhyamika should state a logical 
reason and examples of an other-acknowledged inference. This interpreta-
tion consents with that proposed by MacDonald 2003: 167f. According to 
Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa, Candrakīrti there eliminates the need for such an infer-
ence, but then in Pr LVP 19,8–21,7, Candrakīrti shows that Buddhapālita 
has presented an other-acknowledged inference. See dBu ma tshig gsal 
gyi ti ka 16b3–17b2 cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2006: 95ﬀ ., Text 7 
[109–112] and 114 ad Pr LVP 18,5ﬀ .: athāpi syāt / mādhyamikānāṃ pa-
kṣa hetudṣṭāntānām asiddheḥ sva tantrānumānānabhidhāyitvāt sva-
ta ut patti pratiṣedhapratijñārtha sādhanaṃ (according to MacDonald 
2003: 167; LVP: -pratijñātārthasādhanaṃ) mā bhūd ubha ya siddhena vā-
nu mānena para pratijñānirākaraṇaṃ… // (= D6b1f., P7a3ﬀ .) = “[It may 
be granted], since Mādhyamikas do not state an autonomous inference 
owing to the non-establishment of the position, the logical reason, and 
the example, that there should be neither a proof of the content of the the-
sis (pratijñārthasādhana) when negating the origination from self, nor a 
refutation of the opponent’s thesis by means of an inference established 
for both [parties]….” 
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tions he terms it a “thesis” (dam bcaʼ). More precisely, he terms 
Buddhapālita’s statement, “Things do not arise from themselves (na 
svata utpadyante bhāvās…),” a “pseudo-thesis” (ltar snaṅ dam bca ,ʼ 
*pratijñābhāsa) when he interprets it as a prasaṅga reasoning,28 
and when he interprets it as an other-acknowledged inference, he 
renders it as a thesis properly attended by a logical reason, exam-
ples and pervasion.29 But yet, in his view, Buddhapālita’s statement, 
 28 One should note that in the manuscript the expression “pseudo-the-
sis” (ltar snaṅ dam bcaʼ) is a replacement for “negative thesis” (bkag 
pa iʼ dam bcaʼ). It is clear that the letters bkag pa iʼ have been deleted 
and the letters ltar snaṅ have been inserted instead. Either Źaṅ Thaṅ sag 
pa himself or the scribe made this correction, which I think proper and 
necessary, because a prasaṅga reasoning is not a thesis that establishes 
negation. Moreover, as will be discussed, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s fi nal posi-
tion is that negation (bkag pa) is also to be negated by the Mādhyamika. 
See dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 12a1f.: ʼgal brjod kyi tshul bśad pa / dṅos 
po rnams bdag las skye ba med de / [~bkag pa iʼ~ deleted] [ltar snaṅ in-
serted] dam bcaʼ ste / dṅos po rnams bdag las skye ba bkag pa tsam dam 
bca iʼ tha sñad du byed paʼo  // = “[The following is] the explanation of 
[Buddhapālita’s] way of indicating contradiction [in the Sāṃkhya theory 
of the origination from self]: [Buddhapālita says] ‘Things do not arise 
from themselves.’ [This is] a {pseudo} thesis. [Buddhapālita] made the 
mere negation of things’ origination from self in a transactional usage of 
thesis.”
 29 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 17b6f.: skyaṅs kyi ṅag gis yaṅ lag lṅa 
pa iʼ sbyor ba bstan lugs bśad pa dṅos po rnams bdag las skye ba med 
de ces pas dam bcaʼ ste / dṅos po rnams ni chos can no // graṅs can gyi 
lugs kyis chos can gñis te / bdag las gźan pa iʼ dṅos po rnams daṅ / mṅon 
par gsal ba iʼ bum pa las gźan pa iʼ dṅos po rnams chos can gyi don to // 
bar dʼir yod pa iʼ phyir ces pa iʼ he du kha bskaṅ ṅo  // dpeʼ bstan pa de 
dag gi skye ba don med pa ñid du ʼgyur ba iʼ phyir daṅ ces paʼo // śin tu 
thal bar ʼgyur ba iʼ phyir daṅ źes pa yaṅ dper byaʼo  // = “The explana-
tion of the way in which a formal probative argument (prayoga) with 
fi ve members is stated by Buddhapālita’s words is [as follows]: a thesis 
[is given] by saying ‘Things do not arise from themselves’; ‘Things’ are 
the subject (or “the property possessor”; chos can, dharmin). According 
to the Sāṃkhya tenet, the subject is twofold: ‘things other than self’ 
and ‘things other than a directly perceptible pot’ are the subject matter. 
Between these [thesis and examples], the reason (hetu), ‘because [they] 
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whether it is read as a prasaṅga or a paraprasiddhānumāna, is safe 
from being a genuine thesis in terms of Buddhist logicians, because 
it is not intended as what is to be proven by Buddhapālita himself. 
Moreover, all those Madhyamaka teachers, Nāgārjuna, Buddha-
pālita and Candrakīrti, have solely negated others’ positions with-
out intending to prove something positively as their own position.30 
Therefore, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa maintains, their statements cannot be 
genuine theses but must be regarded as theses only in transactional 
usage.
To these arguments for sanctioning the Mādhyamikas’ use of 
theses, however, the following objection may well arise: The nega-
tion itself can be construed as a probandum that the Madhyamaka 
masters have intended to prove. By negating the origination from 
self, for instance, they would intend to establish the non-origina-
tion from self as their own thesis, even though they insist that it is 
mere transactional usage.31 Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa indeed deals with this 
exist,’ is to be added. [Buddhapālita] shows an example (dpe, dṣṭānta) 
by saying ‘because their origination would be pointless and….’ [His 
subsequent statement] ‘because [it] would be over-extended and’ is also 
stated as an example.” Also, ibid.: 18a3: dṅos po rnams bdag las skye 
ba med de dam bcaʼ / yod pa iʼ phyir he du / khyab pa ni dpeʼ daṅ gcig / 
dam bcaʼ slar brjod jʼug sdud do  / “Thesis: Things do not arise from 
themselves. Reason: Because they exist. The pervasion is the same as the 
examples [show]. The conclusion is the restatement of the thesis.” As for 
the details of Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s interpretation of the pointlessness and 
the over-extension of the origination from self, given in ablative forms 
(tadutpādavaiyārthyāt atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca) as the example or the proof 
of pervasion, see Yoshimizu 2006: 89–94 and Yoshimizu 2008. 
 30 Cf. Pr LVP 34,5: parapratijñāniṣedhaphalatvād asmadanumānānām /
 31 The possibility should also be precluded that the negation here in 
question might be an implicative type of negation (i.e., paryudāsa, ma 
yin dgag) that aﬃ  rms the contrary position, that things arise from oth-
ers. Both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti take the negations in MMK 1.1 
as non-implicative negations (i.e., prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag). See 
Prajñāpradīpa (Prajp) D48b6f., P58a6f.: bdag las ma yin źes bya ba iʼ 
dgag pa dʼi ni med par dgag pa iʼ don du lta bar bya ste / dgag pa gtso 
che ba iʼ phyir daṅ / dʼi ltar rtogs pa (P rtog pa) ma lus pa iʼ draṅ dgag pas 
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objection by introducing mainly ontology-based arguments. That 
will be our next subject of consideration.
Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s defense and his fi nal position that the 
Mādhyamika does not even accept negation (bkag pa) as a 
probandum
A crucial point is how to interpret the value of the negation of orig-
ination, which brings a logical and doctrinal determination for the 
Mādhyamika himself. Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa fi rst discusses the issue just 
after the aforementioned statement [1].32 Let us see his argument, 
which is based on an ontological observation:
[3.1] [Objection:] Granted that [your] intended thesis (ʼ dod dam bcaʼ) 
is mere name (miṅ tsam), it is established with regard to entities (dṅos 
po) as a genuine thesis (dam bcaʼ rnal ma), for non-origination is 
established by [your] negating origination, because [these] two, i.e., 
origination and non-origination, are [respectively] positive determi-
nation (yoṅs gcod) and negative determination (rnam gcod), and be-
cause according to the principle of direct contradiction (dṅos ʼgal) the 
negation of one results in the establishment of the other.33 Thus, the 
thesis (dam bcaʼ) that there is no origination is indirectly established.
rnam par mi rtog pa iʼ ye śes śes bya iʼ yul ma lus pa daṅ ldan pa ʼgrub par 
dgoṅs pa iʼ phyir ro // and Pr LVP 13,4ﬀ .: nanu ca, naiva sva ta utpannā, 
ity avadhāryamāṇe parata utpannā ity aniṣṭaṃ prāpnoti / na prāpno ti, 
prasajya pratiṣedhasya vivakṣitatvāt parato ʼpy utpādasya prati ṣe tsya-
mā natvāt /
 32 See statement [1] cited above in n. 18 from dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 
10b1. He further develops it after statement [2], cited above in n. 26 from 
dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 15a1f., as will be discussed below.
 33 The principle of direct contradiction conforms with the princi-
ple of the excluded middle, which holds in any logical discussion. The 
Madhyama ka masters, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, also apply it to their 
argument for negating self-nature. Cf., e.g., Madhyamakālaṃkāravtti 
(MAlv) ad Madhya ma kālaṃkāra (MAl) 1 D56b7f. (Ichigo 1985: 22): raṅ 
bźin yod par gyur na ni gcig paʼam cig śos las mi dʼaʼo // de dag ni phan 
tshun spaṅs te gnas pa iʼ mtshan ñid yin pas phuṅ po gźan sel bar byed 
do // Madhyamakāloka (MĀ) D191a4f. (cited in Tsoṅ kha pa’s rTsa śe ṭik 
chen 25b4f.): phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa iʼ mtshan ñid kyi chos dag ni cig 
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[Reply:] The error that [you] have stated does not exist, for, if we ne-
gated the origination that is unexamined [by an analytical reason-
ing] (ma brtags pa iʼ skye ba), non-origination would be established, 
but we negate the origination postulated [by the Sāṃkhya] (btags pa iʼ 
skye ba), so that the non-origination that is unanalyzed [by a reason-
ing] (ma dpyad pa iʼ skye med) does not come to be established, since 
[these] two, viz., examined origination (brtags pa iʼ skye ba) and un-
examined non-origination (ma brtags pa iʼ skye med), are not directly 
contradictory (dṅos ʼgal).34
Here Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s wording is puzzling, but in eﬀ ect, there is 
no substantial diﬀ erence between the notions “unexamined” (ma 
brtags pa) and “unanalyzed” (ma dpyad pa), which both refer to 
the origination that is conventionally accepted by the world (i.e., 
kun rdzob, saṃvti), without being examined by a reasoning which 
analyzes ultimate existence (i.e., don dam, paramārtha).35 Since the 
śos dgag pa / gźan sgrub pa med na med pa yin pa iʼ phyir gñi ga ma yin 
pa iʼ phyogs su rtog pa yaṅ rigs pa daṅ ldan pa ma yin no //
 34 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 10b1ﬀ .: gal te dʼod dam bcaʼ ces pa miṅ 
tsam du dʼod kyaṅ dṅos po la dam bcaʼ rnal mar grub ste / skye ba bkag 
pas skye myed grub par ʼgyur te / skye ba daṅ skye med gñis rnam gcod 
yoṅs gcod yin pa iʼ phyir daṅ / dṅos ʼgal gyi lugs kyis cig bkag pa cig gi 
sgrub byed du ʼoṅ pa iʼ phyir ro / de ltar na śugs la skye ba med pa źes bya 
ba iʼ dam bcaʼ grub po ce na // brjod pa skyon de ni med de // kho bo cag 
gis ma brtags pa iʼ skye ba bkag na / skye med de grub par thal ba bden 
mod kyi / kho bo cag ni btags pa iʼ skye ba ʼgog pas ma dpyad pa iʼ skye 
myed grub par mi ʼgyur te / brtags pa iʼ skye ba daṅ ma brtags pa iʼ skye 
med gñis dṅos ʼgal ma yin pa iʼ phyir ro //
 35 The establishment of things without examination or analysis could 
be adopted from the defi nition of the conventional (kun rdzob) by 
Śāntarakṣita in MAl 64–65 that the conventional is agreeable and ac-
ceptable only as long as it is not examined (see Ichigō 1985: CXXV, tr. 
CXLII): ma brtags gcig pu ñams dgaʼ źiṅ // skye ba daṅ jʼig pa iʼ chos can 
pa // don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi // raṅ bźin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs // 
brtags pa ma byas ñams dgaʼ baʼaṅ // bdag rgyu sṅa ma sṅa ma la // brten 
nas phyi ma phyi ma yi // ʼbras bu de dʼra ʼbyuṅ ba yin // Phya pa Chos 
kyi seṅ ge also makes use of the notions “unexamined” and “unanalyzed” 
in his Śar gsum stoṅ thun. See, e.g., his defi nition of the conventional as 
that which is true in the perspective of non-analytical thinking (16,4f.: 
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origination “postulated” (btags pa) by the Sāṃkhya opponent does 
not exist even conventionally, the negation of this kind of origi-
nation cannot result in establishing conventional non-origination 
from the Madhyamaka point of view. Then, Źaṅ continues his dis-
cussion as follows:
[3.2] [Objection:] Although that failure does not exist, it still follows 
that the non-origination that is examined [by an analytical reasoning] 
(skye med brtags pa) is established by [your] negating the origination 
that is examined [by an analytical reasoning] (skye ba brtags pa).
[Reply:] No, it doesn’t. The establishment of imagined non-origina-
tion (skye med kun brtags) does not result in establishing a thesis (dam 
bca ,ʼ pratijñā), for none [of] the characteristics of the thesis (dam bca iʼ 
mtshan ñid) are observed, because the origination postulated [by the 
Sāṃkhya] (btags pa iʼ skye ba) and the unexamined non-origination 
that is imagined (ma brtags pa iʼ skye med kun brtags) are nothing but 
names (miṅ ñid). Or alternatively (rnam pa gcig du na),36 [accord-
ing to the principle of the excluded middle one could posit that] non-
origination is established by virtue of negating origination. By this 
alone, however, no thesis comes to be established, for a thesis intends 
a state of aﬀ airs (don, artha) as something to be proven (sgrub bya, 
sādhya), and yet we do not even intend non-origination as something 
to be proven.37
ma dpyad pa iʼ bsam ṅor bden pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa iʼ mtshan ñid 
do). In the next passage cited in the body of the present paper, however, 
Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa subsumes the unexamined conventional establishment 
of non-origination under the concept “imagined.” I am deeply indebted 
to Kevin Vose for both interpretation of the notions “unexamined” (ma 
brtags pa) and “unanalyzed” (ma dpyad pa) and information about Phya 
pa’s use thereof.
 36 The phrase rnam pa gcig du na can be identifi ed with the phrase 
rnam pa gcig tu na, which is used in canonical texts as the translation 
of the Sanskrit phrase atha vā. In the manuscript of the dBu ma tshig 
gsal gyi ti ka, the letter du often appears in the place where according to 
Tibetan orthography the letter tu should appear. 
 37 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 10b3f.: gal te ñes pa de med mod kyi ʼon 
kyaṅ skye ba brtags pa bkag pas skye med brtags pa grub par thal lo ce 
na / ma yin te skye med kun brtags grub pas dam bcaʼ grub par mi ʼgyur 
te / btags pa iʼ skye ba daṅ ma brtags pa iʼ skye med kun brtags ni miṅ ñid 
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On my reading, the opponent is presumably pointing out the pos-
sibility that the substantially real or ultimate non-origination that 
bears “examination” (brtags pa) might be established by negating 
the origination that is examined and purportedly established as real 
by the Sāṃkhya. In his reply, Zhaṅ Thaṅ sag pa rejects this objec-
tion by defi ning the Mādhyamika’s establishment of non-origina-
tion as “imagined” (kun brtags, parikalpita). Thus eliminating the 
establishment of ultimate non-origination, he likewise character-
izes the conventional non-origination that is unexamined as “imag-
ined” (ma brtags pa iʼ skye med kun brtags).38 To sum up, Źaṅ Thaṅ 
sag pa is arguing that the non-origination from self is, be it ulti-
mate or conventional, merely imagined and constructed by name 
(miṅ) or verbal transaction.39 From the viewpoint of Candrakīrti’s 
Madhyamaka, the negation of origination from self gains neither 
ultimate nor conventional ontological establishment.
yin pa iʼ phyir dam bca iʼ mtshan ñid mi dmyigs so // rnam pa gcig du na 
skye ba bkag pas skye med grub kyaṅ de tsam gyis dam bcaʼ ʼgrub par mi 
ʼgyur te // dam bcaʼ ni don sgrub byar dʼod pa yin la / kho bo cag ni skye 
med sgrub byar yaṅ mi dʼod pa iʼ phyir ro //
 38 I prefer leaving ma brtags pa iʼ skye med kun brtags as it appears in 
the manuscript and not emending it to brtags pa iʼ skye med kun brtags, 
since the latter sounds like a tautology. My solution, moreover, suggests 
that in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka system even conventional non-origi-
nation or the negation of origination is regarded as being imagined. 
 39 The underlying idea is, in my view, that the imagined characteris-
tic (kun brtags pa iʼ mtshan ñid, parikalpitalakṣaṇa) is non-substantial 
with regard to characteristics (lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā) and therefore 
not substantially existent but merely postulated by names, as taught in 
Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (SNSū) chapter 7 (Lamotte 1935: 67f., tr. 194): 
don dam yaṅ dag ʼphags de la chos rnams kyi mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med 
pa ñid gaṅ źe na / kun brtags pa iʼ mtshan ñid gaṅ yin paʼo / de ci iʼ phyir 
źe na  / dʼi ltar de ni miṅ daṅ brdas rnam par bźag pa iʼ mtshan ñid yin 
gyi / raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis rnam par gnas pa ni ma yin pas de iʼ phyir 
de ni mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med pa ñid ces byaʼo // Tsoṅ kha pa evidently 
shares this idea, for he forms the concept raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa 
to describe substantial existence on the basis of the three kinds of non-
substantiality taught in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, as I have extensively 
discussed (cf., e.g., Yoshimizu 1993).
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For the purpose of ruling out the possibility that the Mādhyamika 
could establish the non-origination from self as his own thesis, Źaṅ 
Thaṅ sag pa adverts in the last portion of his reply again to the 
logicians’ thesis-defi nition and indicates that a genuine thesis es-
tablishes a probandum that has substantial reality, saying, “for a 
thesis intends a state of aﬀ airs (don, artha) as something to be prov-
en.” The condition that both the reason (hetu) and the probandum 
(sādhya) in an inference must be a real state of aﬀ airs (artha), and 
not imagined, can be found in Dharmakīrti’s PV 4.13 on Dignāga’s 
PS 3.1ab (parārthānumānaṃ tu svadṣṭārthaprakāśanam).40 Źaṅ 
Thaṅ sag pa means that since non-origination is not such a real 
state of aﬀ airs nor is it substantially existent, it cannot be a genuine 
thesis. His argument ends with the emphasis that the Mādhyamika 
does not even intend the negation of origination as a probandum.
Interestingly, he confronts the same problem elsewhere, too, af-
ter the aforementioned statement [2].41 There he clarifi es the value 
of the negation in Candrakīrti’s system in contrast with that in the 
system of the three masters from the East (śar gsum pa). Replying 
to the objection that his statement [2] involves acceptance (khas 
len, abhyupagama) of reason, pervasion and the like,42 Źaṅ Thaṅ 
sag pa argues as follows:
 40 PS 3.1 (Tillemans 2000:  9): parārthānumānaṃ tu sva dṣṭā rtha-
prakāśanam / tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ // = (Tillemans 
tr.) “An inference-for-others, however, elucidates the state of aﬀ airs which 
[the proponent] has understood himself. There, the presentation of the 
inferendum is held to have the goal of the reason as its object.” PV 4.13 
(Tillemans 2000: 24f.): tad arthagrahaṇaṃ śabdakalpanāropitātmanām / 
aliṅgatvaprasiddhyartham arthād arthaprasiddhitaḥ // = (Tillemans tr.) 
“This word ‘state of aﬀ airs’ [in Dignāga’s defi nition of an inference-for-
others, i.e., svadṣṭārthaprakāśana] is designed to establish that things 
whose natures are verbally and conceptually superimposed are not [val-
id] reasons, for [one] state of aﬀ airs [viz., the sādhya] is established from 
[another] state of aﬀ airs [viz., the reason].” For further analysis of these 
verses, cf. Tillemans ibid.
 41 See statement [2] cited above in n. 26 from dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti 
ka 15a1f.
 42 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 15a2: gal te dbuʼ ma pa khyed khas len 
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[4] [Reply:] No, it doesn’t. Whereas the three [texts of the masters 
from] the East [i.e., Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla] in-
tend the negation (bkag pa źig) when they negate entities, having ne-
gated those entities which are [supposed to be] either one or many by 
[the argument] that they are neither one nor many (gcig daṅ du bral, 
ekānekaviyoga), this Mādhyamika [i.e., Candrakīrti] does not intend 
even such a thing as the negation. Because [he] intends that it is noth-
ing (ci yaṅ ma yin), he has no acceptance at all. Or alternatively [one 
could accept the negation but] by a mere acceptance [of the negation] 
there occurs no thesis. There would occur a thesis if one accepted [the 
negation] as what is to be proven (sgrub bya, sādhya), but there is no 
[such] failure because the Mādhyamika does not accept [the negation] 
as what is to be proven.43 
Here Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa draws the same conclusion as that in the afore-
mentioned reply [3.2], that there is no thesis for the Mādhyamika 
because he does not accept any probandum, but from a slightly 
diﬀ erent observation. Describing Candrakīrti’s intentions as “it is 
nothing” (ci yaṅ ma yin), Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa seems to be resorting 
to the theory of “freedom from extremes” (mthaʼ bral) in terms 
of “neither existence nor non-existence” (yod min med min), ac-
med par dʼod kyaṅ khas len daṅ bcas pa ñid de  / raṅ rgyud kyi he du 
brjod pa la raṅ rgyud kyi sgrub bya mtshan ñid can yin pas khyab ces 
khyab bya khas blaṅs so // sgrub bya khas blaṅs pa med pa iʼ phyir ces 
he du khas blaṅs so // de iʼ phyir khas len can du ʼgyur ro źe na / = “[3]
[Objection:] Although you Mādhyamikas assert to have no acceptance, 
[your statements] defi nitely involve an acceptance, for you accept the per-
vasion in saying, ‘the formulation of an autonomous logical reason [i.e., 
an autonomous reasoning or inference] entails that the probandum of the 
autonomous inference has a [genuine] characteristic.’ [And] you accept 
the reason in saying, ‘because for him the asserted probandum does not 
exist.’”
 43 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 15a2f.: ma yin te śar gsum pa gcig daṅ du 
bral gyis gcig daṅ du ma iʼ dṅos po bkag nas dṅos po bkag pa iʼ bkag pa źig 
dʼod la / dbu ma pa dʼi ni bkag pa de de lta bu yaṅ mi dʼod de / ci yaṅ ma 
yin par dʼod pas khas blaṅs gaṅ yaṅ med do // rnam pa gcig du na khas 
blaṅs pa tsam gyis dam bcar mi ʼgyur te / sgrub byar khas blaṅs na dam 
bcar ʼ gro la / dbuʼ ma pas sgrub byar khas ma blaṅs pa iʼ phyir ñes pa med 
do //
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cording to which even the negation should be counted among what 
is to be abandoned.44 And the non-acceptance of the negation as 
a probandum is Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa’s fi nal argument to ensure the 
Mādhyamika’s disowning of a thesis. He thereby completely diﬀ er-
entiates Candrakīrti’s system from that of those who intend a nega-
tive determination, such as the non-existence of intrinsic nature 
(niḥsvabhāvatā), by means of an autonomous proof.45
In this regard, it is signifi cant that Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa defi nes the 
nature of non-implicative negation (med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha) 
specifi c to the Madhyamaka system and sets it apart from the tra-
ditional defi nition thereof, which both Buddhist logicians and their 
followers, viz., Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, are sup-
posed to have acknowledged.46 Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa states as follows:
 44 As I have closely discussed, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa demonstrates this the-
ory in his commentary on the 18th chapter of the Prasannapadā without 
mentioning the designations mthaʼ bral or yod min med min. See dBu ma 
tshig gsal gyi ti ka 74b6 (cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2005: 136): 
theg pa gsum gyi rigs can stoṅ ñid kyi sa bon smin pa la bdag med pa 
daṅ bdag bkag pa iʼ bkag pa yaṅ med ces so // One should note that the 
logical rule of double negation, in the sense that the negation of the ne-
gation of a position aﬃ  rms the position, is inapplicable to the theory 
of freedom from extremes. For the rule of double negation, cf., e.g., 
Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin) chapter 3 in the passage preceding the head 
of the Sanskrit fragment edited by Matsuda and Steinkellner (1991). See 
PVin chapter 3 D224b7, P323b4: mthun pa iʼ phyogs ma yin pa ñid la med 
do źes bya bas ni ʼ di mthun pa iʼ phyogs la yod par brjod pa yin te / dgag pa 
gñis kyis (emended : DP kyi) rnal ma go ba iʼ phyir ro / Manuscript A64a2: 
asapakṣa eva nāstīti cāsya sapakṣe sʼtitocyate, pratiṣedhadvayena pra-
kta gamanāt / Cf. also ibid. D225a2, P323b6: de dgag pa bkag pa iʼ ṅo bo 
ni sgrub pa iʼ raṅ bźin yin pa iʼ phyir ro // Manuscript A64a4, Matsuda and 
Steinkellner 1991: 142: pratiṣedhaniṣedhasya vidhānarūpatvāt  / I owe 
this information to Tom Tillemans and Pascale Hugon. 
 45 The masters from the East maintain that the Mādhyamika establish-
es the negation of superimposed ultimate intrinsic natures. Cf., e.g., MĀ 
D179b5–180a2 cited and translated in Keira 2004: 31f.
 46 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 11a3: sgra iʼ dbaṅ du byas na bya ba daṅ 
ʼbrel ba don gyi dgag pa ston pa ste med dgag ste / dper na śid zan mi bzaʼ 
ces pa ste bzaʼ ces pa bya ba yin / de daṅ dgag tshig mi gñis sbyar bas 
462 Chizuko Yoshimizu
[5] The non-implicative negation (med dgag) by Buddhist logicians 
(tshad ma pa) is also regarded as implicative negation (ma yin dgag) 
from the Madhyamaka [viewpoint]. They implicitly intend the prop-
erty of negation [or the property of being negated] (dkag pa iʼ chos źig) 
after negating the blue. Mādhyamikas do not even intend the negation, 
because [they] intend that it is nothing (ci yaṅ ma yin). [They] intend 
neither the collection of the property and the property-possessor (chos 
daṅ chos can gyi tshogs don), nor the property-possessor, nor the sin-
gle property to be proven (sgrub bya iʼ chos), [i.e.,] the non-existence 
of intrinsic nature (raṅ bźin med).47
In this way, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa throughout insists on negating the 
negation with regard to Mādhyamikas’ negative statements.48 
Obviously, he opposes Candrakīrti’s system to that of those adher-
ents of logic who had been regarded as authentic Mādhyamikas 
in Tibet until Candrakīrti’s works were introduced. In fact, Źaṅ 
mi bzaʼ ces so // des na śid zan za ba bkag pa tsam sgrub pas med dgag 
go / It also deserves attention that Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa defi nes med dgag in 
general as the “establishment of mere negation [e.g.,] of the eating of food 
oﬀ erings” (śid zan za ba bkag pa tsam sgrub pa 11a3). This interpreta-
tion is diﬀ erent from the well-known defi nition of prasajyapratiṣedha in 
Tarkajvālā (TJ) D59b5f.: med par dgag pa ni dṅos po iʼ ṅo bo ñid tsam 
źig ʼgog par zad kyi de daṅ dʼra ba de ma yin pa gźan gyi dṅos pos grub 
par mi byed pa ste / dper na bram zas chaṅ btuṅ bar mi byaʼo źes bya ba 
de tsam źig ʼgog par zad kyi de las gźan pa iʼ btuṅ ba btuṅ ṅo źeʼam mi 
btuṅ ṅo źes mi brjod pa lta buʼo // Cf. further Phya pa’s defi nition cited 
below in n. 49. As for the two kinds of negations, viz., paryudāsa and 
prasajyapratiṣedha, in the Indian Buddhist tradition, see, e.g., Kajiyama 
1973.
 47 dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 11a4: tshad ma pa iʼ med dgag kyaṅ dbuʼ 
ma pa la ltos nas ma yin dgag du ʼgro ste / sṅon po bkag nas bkag pa iʼ 
chos źig śul du dʼod paʼo // dbuʼ ma pa ni bkag pa yaṅ mi dʼod te / ci yaṅ 
ma yin par dʼod pa iʼ phyir ro // chos daṅ chos can gyi tshogs don yaṅ mi 
dʼod [chos can yaṅ mi dʼod inserted] sgrub bya iʼ chos [raṅ bźin med in-
serted] rkyaṅ pa yaṅ mi dʼod zer /
 48 Cf. Nāgārjuna’s statements in his VV 63 that he negates nothing and 
that there exists nothing to be negated. He also describes in VV 23 the 
nature of negative statements as an illusion which stops another illusion 
(cited and translated in Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 119f). 
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Thaṅ sag pa’s contemporary Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) 
defi nes non-implicative negation (med dgag) in the system of the 
masters from the East as apprehending “sole negation” (i.e., dgag 
pa ʼbaʼ źig par blos źen par bya ba).49 It is further interesting to re-
call that Tsoṅ kha pa (1357–1419) expressly reiterates the view that 
non-implicative negation (med dgag) is an establishment of nega-
tion.50 Now one can properly assume that Tsoṅ kha pa thereby tried 
to integrate the view of the masters from the East into Candrakīrti’s 
Madhyamaka system. Go rams pa later made a sharp rejoinder to 
Tsoṅ kha pa, defending the theory of “neither existence nor non-
existence.”51 
 49 Śar gsum stoṅ thun 87,9f.: sgrub pa ʼbaʼ źig daṅ dgag sgrub tshogs 
pa ma yin dgag yin la dgag pa ʼbaʼ źig pa myed dgag yin pas med dgag 
gi mtshan ñid ni ldog pa de kha yar ṅes pa na dgag pa ʼbaʼ źig par blos 
źen par bya ba yin la / It is unclear whether Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa and Phya pa 
actually knew each other.
 50 Cf., e.g., rTsa śe ṭik chen 25a1ﬀ .: dam bcaʼ bźi med dgag tu bźed pa iʼ 
phyir raṅ bźin ʼgog pa iʼ skabs thams cad du med dgag rtags kyi bsgrub 
byar byaʼo // des na tshig gsal las / rjes su dpag pa dag ni gźan gyi dam 
bcaʼ ba ʼgog pa tsam gyi ʼbras bu can yin pa iʼ phyir ro // źes gsuṅs pa yaṅ 
raṅ bźin yod pa rnam par bcad tsam źig sbyor ba rnams kyis sgrub kyi 
de las gźan pa iʼ chos gźan mi sgrub pa iʼ don yin pas raṅ bźin yod pa ʼgog 
gi med pa mi sgrub ces pa min no  // Quoting this passage, Matsumoto 
(1997:  321f.) has described it as an “astonishing statement,” meaning 
that it is completely diﬀ erent from the thought of non-implicative nega-
tion introduced by Bhāviveka into the Madhyamaka tradition. The fact 
is, however, that Tsoṅ kha pa’s statement shows full agreement with the 
interpretation which Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa has ascribed to Buddhist logicians. 
Matsumoto has carefully compared Tsoṅ kha pa’s view with Bhāviveka’s 
concerning non-implicative negation and detailed the unique character-
istics of Tsoṅ kha pa’s Madhyamaka thought. It will become clear upon 
reading earlier Tibetan treatises to what extent Tsoṅ kha pa owes his 
thought to early masters.
 51 Regarding the controversy between Tsoṅ kha pa and Go rams pa 
et al., cf., e.g., Matsumoto 1997: 288ﬀ ., Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 195–266, 
Cabezón 2003, Cabezón 2007, and Yoshimizu 2005: 137ﬀ .
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Concluding remarks
The problem of whether the Mādhyamika should propound theses 
of his own has developed in Tibet into the controversy as to wheth-
er the Mādhyamika should establish or adopt the negation of intrin-
sic nature as his own probandum. This controversy fi rst took place 
between the followers of the Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśīla lineage of 
Madhyamaka and the followers of the newly introduced Madhya-
maka of Candrakīrti (i.e., between the so-called Svātantrika and 
Prāsaṅgika). Due to Tsoṅ kha pa’s integration of the logical methods 
shared by the Buddhist logicians and Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśīla into 
Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka system, however, this debate shifted to 
a matter for dispute among the adherents of Candrakīrti in the dGe 
lugs and Sa skya schools. Considered from the historical perspec-
tive, one should review the value and the nature of the thesis for the 
Mādhyamika in wider scope, including the Buddhist logical tra-
dition. The infl uence of the Madhyamaka thought of Śāntarakṣita 
and Kamalaśīla, in particular, needs to be reexamined.
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